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IN THE UTAH SuPRhMl:. O )l >RT 
A.K.&P WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
)HI \TIN( i , 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
vs. 
THOMAS D. GTT and ASPEN 
CONSTRi'CllON .1 ! i.ili 
corporate »i.. 
Defendants/Appellants. 
: Priority No. 15 
: No. 20020495-SC 
: '1 rial Court Case: 
: V U J U O O H C N 
APPELLI I S BRIEF 
on certiorari, from a, decision of the I Uah Court of Appeals 
on appeal from an ()rder of the 
Third Judicial District Court 
Summit Count}. Utah 
I he I lonorable !;»^»i r, \it^\ ,vv..,-__ ^ 
JURISDICTION 
The TTtah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
, , i §§78 2-2(5), 78 2J i 1 i u Il II il l R i ] »j I Il I ! \ xU : s 3. \, 15 51. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did (he < 'ourt of Appeals commit error by ruling that the term,, "successful 
party" is synonymous \\nw ihe term, "prevailing party" for the purpose of determining 
SI! ANDARD OF REVIEW !) "The Standard of Review on :nneal of the 
2 
reasonableness of a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of 
discretion." Faust v. Kai Technologies, Inc., 15 P.3d 1266 (Utah 2000)1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 2) "The interpretation of a statute poses a question of 
law which this court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower court's 
conclusions." Zoll and Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997). The Court 
of Appeals determination that the terms prevailing party and successful party are 
synonymous involves the interpretation of a statute which an appellate court would 
accord no particular deference, but review for correctness. 
CITATION TO RECORD WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED: Defendants' 
Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Defendants' Request for Attorney 
Fees filed November 2, 1999, Record 1975; Notice of Appeal filed November 17, 2000, 
Record 2050. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE 
Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18: 
§38-1-18, Attorneys' fees. Except as provided in Section 38-11-
107, in any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' 
Defendant incorrectly characterizes the issue as being the trial court having incorrectly 
interpreted Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 by denying to award Defendants their attorney 
fees, rather the issue concerns the reasonableness of the fees awarded or in this case not 
awarded. There is nothing in the record suggesting the trial court ruled that fees are not 
recoverable as claimed by Defendants therefore the standard of review is "abuse of 
discretion" not "review for correctness without deference to the lower court's 
conclusions." 
3 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. Amended by Laws 1961, c 76; Laws 1995 * /~7 <4 eff. 
May ./, 1995, 
S I A: I EIVIE.N I OF • I HE CASE 
\ 1 4AT 1 fRE OF FHE CASE: Fliis appeal is from the final judgment (on remand 
from the I Itah Court of Appeals) of the Third District Court, Summit County, where the 
trial court, after crediting Aspen it I tl le amount of $9,. 1.73.00 for the HVAC system 
to w ards ] "h hippie s dan lage aw ai d of $8,646 00. ::lei lied '1 
foreclosure of its mechanic's lien,2 and entered a judgment against Whipple in the 
amount of $527 00 However, because Aspen's monetary recovery was neglkuHe and I-
lost it ;-, v -unkivm.il. . .i ...i conn considered the outcome "a uiau ' and declined to 
ii T)I IRSH OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW: 
1 - \lter lour and one-halt days of trial, Judge Noel ordered foreclosure • -f two or 
V'V hippie' s meel lai lies liei is and awarded :^ ). in damaged unuu;,, ^ , . 
1
 n ^ • . . • - • -81 1 C * ; §3,966 82 9 
™ . j h l i , i997, and jj,-l ;U90 costs of suit.) (Judgment Tf3 dated March 7, 1997, 
recorded in Book XX pages 311-316 - Addendum 3) 
2 
See Aspen . .\jaendun; ipple" s 1 4oti.ee of Clain l of I ien filed September 1 1. 
1993. 
4 
an order remanding the matter to the trial court for disposition consistent with its opinion. 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 
1999). After remand, the trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys and 
set deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Utah 
Court of Appeals for resolution by the trial court. The trial court held a hearing on 
November 10, 1999, at which time the trial court heard arguments and took evidence (by 
way of affidavit) as to the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the parties. On January 
20, 2000, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision as to the remaining issues -
Record 2022. The trial court, after calculating the offset for the HVAC system towards 
Whipple's recovery entered a money judgment in favor of the homeowner and Aspen 
and against Whipple in the amount of $527.00. The trial court declined to award either 
party their reasonable attorney fees based upon an analysis which, while resulting in a 
monetary award to Defendants of $527.00, actually calculated a net advantage to 
Whipple in the amount of $17,473.00. Based thereon, the court was of the opinion that 
the outcome was essentially "a draw" and concluded neither party should be awarded it's 
fees. 
Sometime in September, 2000, Whipple's attorney submitted Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order of Foreclosure as directed by the 
trial court in the Memorandum Decision. The trial court signed the amended pleadings 
which were filed with the clerk of the court on October 18, 2000. On November 17, 
2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to 
award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending 
against the lien foreclosure proceeding in this action. 
On March 14, 2002, the Court of Appeals entered its decision upholding the trial 
court. On May 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals entered an order denying Aspen's Petition 
for Rehearing. Aspen sought certiorari, which this court granted. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS: For purposes of this appeal Whipple respectfully 
submits the following as being relevant for this appeal3: 
1. The trial court occurred over 4 1/2 days — October 11-12, and November 28, 
29, and 30, 1995, during which time the court took evidence of the work which Whipple 
claimed to have provided to the three (3) separate properties.4 Whipple sought lien 
recovery identifying 11 separate claims:5 
3
 A detailed summary of the underlying facts in this case are set forth fully inA.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999), a copy of which 
is included as Addendum "5"to Aspen's Brief of Appellant. 
4 
The three lien foreclosure actions which were consolidated for purposes of trial are 
referenced hereinafter for the convenience of the Court as: (1) the Dianne Quinn property 
lien; (2) the Tom Guy pool house property lien; and (3) the Thaynes Canyon property 
lien. 
5 
Whipple's claims related to the Thaynes property are summarized as follows: 
Reference Amount 
Laterals (sewer) $10,200.00 
French drains $ 3,162.05 





1. Sewer laterals 
2. Thomas Guy pool house 
3. Diane Quinn sump pump 
4. Municipal water line re-location 
5. French drains 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr. 
6. Backhoe 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr. 
7. Pool house miscellaneous 
8. Diane Quinn gas line 
9. 77 Thaynes house plumbing 
10. 77 Thaynes house heating 
11. 77 Thaynes house gas piping 
Total Jobs 
Payments 
Principal Balance Due 





























2. Whipple was a licensed plumbing contractor but an unlicensed HVAC 
(Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) contractor. At the outset of the litigation, 
Aspen filed a Motion to Dismiss the HVAC portion of the mechanics' lien claim which 
Judge Brian granted, however, Whipple was allowed to recover the value he conferred 
on the Thaynes Canyon property. During the trial Judge Noel allowed Whipple to 
introduce evidence as to the HVAC claim and eventually allowed Whipple to recover for 
such on an "equitable basis." (Judge Brian's Pretrial Ruling of May 8, 1995 (Record 










3. A timely appeal was filed which was transferred to the Court of Appeals. 
4. On March 18, 1999, the Court of Appeals entered an opinion (first appeal) 
remanding this matter to the trial court for disposition of the matter consistent with its 
opinion stating: 
f31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party 
shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by 
the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-18 (1997). In this case, although the trial court initially 
granted Aspen's motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's 
mechanics' lien claim because of improper licensure, it went on to 
award Whipple the value of the work performed on Aspen's 
property. Based in part on this finding, the trial court concluded that 
Whipple was the prevailing party and entitled to an award of 
attorney fees. However, this conclusion may be erroneous in light 
of our determination that section 58-55-604 precludes Whipple from 
recovering for its HVAC work. Based upon our review of the 
record, it appears the HVAC claim was the single most important 
issue in this case and Aspen, having fully prevailed on the HVAC 
claim in this appeal, may now be entitled to prevailing party status 
under section 38-1-18. If on remand the trial court determines 
Aspen is the prevailing party under section 38-1-18, then Aspen 
must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding attorney 
fees incurred in pursuing its claim. We therefore remand this issue 
to the trial court for a redetermination of the attorney fees award 
consistent with this opinion and the entry of findings necessary to 
support the revised award. [Emphasis supplied by the Appellants.] 
(p. 525) A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 
977 P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
A more complete summary of the underlying facts are set forth fully in A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const, 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999) cert. 
denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). (Addendum 5 of Aspen's Brief) Shortly after the 
8 
remand, the trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys and set deadlines to 
submit memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Court of Appeals for 
resolution by the trial court. (Telephone conference with Judge Noel held September 13, 
1999.) 
5. On November 2, 1999, Aspen submitted their Memorandum of Law and 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees which detailed the dates the work was performed, the hourly 
rate, the time spent, and described in detail the nature of the services performed. 
Additionally, the Aspen's attorney allocated the fees between: (1) the successful claims 
for which there may have been entitlement to fees; (2) the unsuccessful claims for which 
there would have been a claim for fees had the claims been successful; and (3) the claims 
for which there would be no entitlement to attorney's fees. (Aspen's Attorney's 
Affidavit-Record 1975) 
6. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, in Salt Lake City. The 
court heard arguments and took evidence from the homeowner and builder's attorney as 
to the reasonable attorney fees incurred by the homeowner and builder. Whipple's 
attorney argued at the hearing that he could not allocate the fees between the three 
properties, but after the hearing submitted his affidavit apportioning his attorney fees 
between the three properties. (Record 2062, Transcript of Hearing, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
November 10, 1999) 
7. On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its memorandum decision as to the 
9 
remaining issues. The trial court denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of its 
Thaynes Canyon property mechanics' lien and entered a judgment against Whipple in the 
amount of $527.00. (Record 2022) The initial appeal and subsequent remand involved 
three (3) separate lien foreclosure matters which were consolidated for trial. The trial 
court held for Whipple on the other two (2) lien foreclosure matters, determined the lien 
amounts ($631.00 and $1,666.00 respectively), found Whipple to be the "successful 
party" with respect to those liens, determined $2,500.00 to be the reasonable attorney 
fees related to each of those lien foreclosure matters ($5,000.00 total), and entered orders 
foreclosing those two parcels of property respectively. (Record 2022) (Those judgments 
of foreclosure have subsequently been paid and satisfied by Aspen.) 
8. Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of foreclosure of its 
Thaynes Canyon property mechanics' lien, the trial court declined to award Aspen its 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the foreclosure, 
which they had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C.A. (Record 2022) 
9. In September 2000, Whipple's attorney submitted Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order in accordance with the trial court's 
January 20, 2000, Memorandum Decision. These were subsequently signed by the trial 
court and were later entered by the clerk on October 18, 2000. (Record 2029) On 
November 17, 2000, Aspen filed a Notice of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's 
failure to award it it's attorney fees based on its net recovery of $527.00. No cross 
10 
appeal was filed by Whipple. (Record 2050) 
10. In March of 2002 the court of appeals upheld the trial court and on Ma} 6, 
2002, denied Aspen's Petition for Rehearing. (The opinion on the second appeal of the 
Court of Appeals is found at Addendum 6 to Aspen's Brief.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the terms "successful party" and 
"prevailing party" have historically been used interchangeably and therefore are 
synonymous for the purpose of determining entitlement to attorney fees under the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18. Notwithstanding Aspen's argument to the 
contrary this judicial confirmation of what has heretofore been an accepted interpretation 
by our appellate courts in no way changes the outcome of this case or future cases to be 
decided under Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18. Moreover, there is no distinction or 
different criteria used in determining a prevailing party from a successful party. 
Therefore, because the trial court considered and weighed the various factors relative to 
the outcome of the Thaynes Canyon property claim in it's decision to not award either 
party its fees and costs it's decision should not be overturned. 
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
I. Response to Legal Analysis. 
Aspen posits the theory that the terms prevailing party and successful party are 
mutually exclusive and that to view the terms as synonymous will create ambiguity and 
11 
disparate results. Notwithstanding its claim, Aspen has not put forth any authority that 
would support this contention. Aspen has not cited any case law or statute that 
demonstrates that the terms successful party or the criteria to determine successful party 
is or has been different from the term prevailing party or the criteria to determine 
prevailing party. 
What Aspen appears to do by way of its appeal is to attempt to convince this court 
that such a distinction does exist and that the distinction is that a successful party is 
determined by one who obtains a net judgment, in other words, an advantage however 
slight without regard to any other consideration, while a prevailing party is determined 
only after a balancing and consideration of various factors related to the outcome a 
"flexible and reasoned" approach. It is only by this distinction that Aspen can maintain 
that its paltry recovery of $527.00 in a case where total claims of $65,780.55 were 
involved, entitles it to successful party status and thus a significant award of attorney 
fees. Aspen recognizes that consideration of anything other than a "net judgment rule" 
would defeat any hope of prevailing and support the trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
the matter was essentially a draw or worse, a net advantage for Whipple, if value is 
factored in for the successful defense of claims. 
At the outset of its argument, Aspen identifies eight Utah mechanic's lien cases 
where there was a successful party and said successful party was awarded its attorney 
fees. These cases are distinguishable from this matter in that they involved parties who's 
12 
claims were not reduced or compromised. In other words, even under the definition of 
prevailing party as put forth by Aspen, the result would not have been different. 
Nevertheless, Aspen has failed to show how the results would have been different had 
these parties been identified as prevailing parties. Moreover, Aspen has further failed to 
demonstrate that the successful parties in these cases were defined merely as one who 
obtained a net judgment. The fact is the many cases of this jurisdiction dealing with a 
prevailing party and successful party are not distinguishable from one another. The 
Court of Appeals correctly pointed this out in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. 
Thomas D. Guy; and Aspen Construction, a Utah Corp., 2002 Ut. App. 73 (Whipple II), 
which held: 
"^ j The terms "prevailing party" and "successful party" 
are often used synonymously. See Cobabe v. 
Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 835 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Black's Law Dictionary defines the term 
"prevailing party" as: "A party in whose favor a 
judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of 
damages awarded (in certain cases, the court will 
award attorney [ ] fees to the prevailing party). Also 
termed successful party." Black's Law Dictionary 
1145 (7th ed. 1999). Black's defines a "successful 
party" as follows: "See prevailing party." Id. Perhaps 
the most compelling example of synonymous usage is 
our decision in Whipple L where, referring to the 
"successful party" language of section 38-1-18, we 
consistently substituted the words "prevailing party" in 
our analysis. Whipple L 1999 UT App. at ffi[31, 40; 
see also Reeves, 915 P.2d at 1079 (holding a 
successful party includes one successfully enforces or 
defends against a lien action); J. V. Hatch Constr., Inc. 
v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
13 
("[A] lien claimant's prima facie evidence establishing 
its right to attorney fees is met by showing that it is the 
prevailing party in the mechanics['] lien cause of 
action.")." 
To further show the fallacy of Aspen's argument, we note the Court of Appeals in 
Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neal, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), defines a 
prevailing party the same as Aspen defines "successful party", to-wit: one who either 
obtains a net judgment or who successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment. 
The Court of Appeals held as follows: 
"Typically, determining the "prevailing party" for 
purposes of awarding fees and costs is quite simple. 
Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if 
plaintiff is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, 
and if defendant successfully defends and avoids an 
adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed." 
Clearly, these two terms have historically been used interchangeably and while 
heretofore this may have created some confusion, the Court of Appeals ruling in Whipple 
II has finally clarified this issue, eliminating the potential for any future confusion. This 
clarification does not, as Aspen suggests, make the determination of successful party 
under Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18, more difficult nor will it create a different result 
than previously decided cases. 
Aspen further cites footnote 7 of Mountain States for the proposition that 
prevailing party analysis is a different, more complex approach which makes a 
determination more difficult, particularly when there are multiple claims and parties and 
14 
that to apply this analysis to a mechanics lien case with a "successful party" standaid 
creates the potential for more confusion and makes the determination of a successful 
party more difficult. This argument is not only specious but wrong. 
First, there is no authority that defines successful party merely and exclusively as 
one who obtains a net judgment and foregoes any analysis of competing claims to 
determine successful party status. 
Second, even if a successful party were defined exclusively as one who obtained a 
net judgment, Aspen has failed to demonstrate how this standard would eliminate the 
difficulty of determining successful party status where multiple parties and/or claims 
were involved, where perhaps each of several parties may have prevailed on different 
claims. And even if Aspen would argue that utilizing the net judgment rule would 
eliminate the difficulty of determining the successful party in a case of multiple parties 
and/or claims (which it won't), then wouldn't it make more sense to merely adopt the net 
judgment rule for both successful party and prevailing party (assuming arguendo that the 
two (2) terms are mutually exclusive) thereby eliminating the difficulty which might 
occur in a prevailing party analysis (as defined by Aspen) where multiple parties or 
claims are involved. In other words, if a successful party analysis as proposed by Aspen 
is more expedient than the prevailing party analysis as proposed by Aspen, then the 
adoption of a net judgment rule for a prevailing party analysis seems the more logical 
approach. 
15 
The fact of the matter is that notwithstanding Aspen's argument to the contrary a 
net judgment rule does not ensure the absence of difficulty or absolute predictability of 
outcome where multiple parties and/or claims are involved and would more often than 
not cause inequitable results. Consequently, a net judgment rule under such 
circumstances is no more expedient than the flexible and reasoned approach which the 
courts of this jurisdiction have heretofore utilized in determining prevailing or successful 
party status. 
II. Response to Legislative Presumptions and Prior Judicial Constructions. 
Aspen's argument in this section is merely a restatement of its prior argument. 
Because Aspen has failed to establish that judicially, the terms prevailing party and 
successful party are mutually exclusive and have different meanings or legal effect its 
argument that the Court of Appeals declaration that these two terms are synonymous 
somehow contravenes legislative intent is unfounded and purely specious. The fact of 
the matter is as noted by the Court of Appeals in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating 
v. Aspen Constr., 2002 Ut.App. 73 (Whipple II), these two terms have consistently been 
used interchangeably and there is no precedent in this jurisdiction that treats these terms 
differently. 
III. Response to Public Policy. 
Because Aspen has failed to demonstrate that our court's have distinguished 
prevailing parties from successful parties and in light of the numerous cases where our 
16 
court's have used these terms interchangeably there is no basis to conclude that the Court 
of Appeals decision has abrogated the concept of stare decisis. 
IV. Response to Legal Analysis as Applied to the Facts of this Case. 
At the outset of Point IV, Aspen makes assumptions that are not totally correct or 
are not presented in the right context thus giving an erroneous impression. Therefore, 
for the purpose of factual clarification, Whipple offers the following: 
1. Admittedly, the Thaynes Canyon property was the largest of the three 
liens nevertheless, Whipple was forced to spend significant time preparing for and 
litigating the other two claims since Aspen never conceded either of these claims 
and required Whipple to draft and file pleadings and liens, interview, depose and 
subpoena witnesses, prepare documents for trial and prove said claims at trial 
where Aspen failed to present any defense to either of these claims. 
2. The HVAC claim was not the single most important claim rather the 
plumbing contract was (see Aspen's Addendum 2). 
3. Aspen did not prevail on its counterclaim of a defective HVAC system. 
Aspen was given a $7,000.00 offset an amount far short of its $25,000.00 
counterclaim. 
4. While Aspen prevailed on certain claims it conspicuously failed to 
identify the claims Whipple prevailed on relative to the Thaynes Canyon property 
which were as follows: 
17 
Sewer laterals $10,200.00 
Plumbing $12,158.00 
Gasline $ 1,015.00 
Backhoe $ 100.00 
Defense of Aspen's Counterclaim $18,000.00 
$41,473.00 
5. Curiously, the court never identified the deficiencies or assigned value 
to any specific deficiencies in the HVAC system except the relocation of a heat 
vent which Whipple identified would cost a few hundred dollars. Furthermore, 
the entire HVAC system which Aspen claimed required replacement was never 
replaced and the home was sold with the system as Whipple had installed it with 
minor completion work and fine tuning since Whipple was discharged from the 
job before its completion. 
In Point IV of its argument, Aspen assigns error on two points. First, the trial 
court erred when it held that Aspen's negligence claim against Whipple was not 
inextricable from its HVAC claim and second, that the trial court's award of attorney fees 
to Whipple for its unmitigated successful prosecution of the Diane Quinn property lien 
and the Thomas Guy Poolhouse property lien, while denying Aspen's its fees for its 
nominal money judgment on the Thaynes Canyon property was illogical and inconsistent. 
As to its first challenge Whipple is unclear as to the point Aspen is attempting to 
make. The fact the trial court held the HVAC licensing issue and Aspen's negligence 
claim were not "inextricably tied together" has no bearing on the ultimate outcome unless 
Aspen is suggesting that Whipple's non-licensure automatically renders it negligent, a 
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theory neither advanced by Aspen or supported by law or the facts. 
As to Aspen's second challenge Whipple contends that Aspen's argument is 
patently wrong. To suggest there is no distinction between Whipple's success and 
recovery of its attorney fees relative to the Diane Quinn property lien and Thomas Guy 
Poolhouse property lien and Aspen's nominal recovery and no award of it's attorney fees 
relative to the Thaynes Canyon property is incredulous. As noted supra the Quinn and 
Thomas Guy claims were unequivocal and unmitigated wins. (Even though, Aspen 
failed to mount any defense at trial to these two claims they made Whipple draft and file 
pleadings and liens, interview and subpoena witnesses, prepare exhibits, incur costs 
related to filing liens, lawsuits, and subpoenaing witnesses, and spend time preparing for 
and trying these two claims, a clear act of bad faith, whereas the Thaynes Canyon 
property litigation involved total claims of $65,780.55 and resulted in a mere net 
recovery for Aspen of $527.00. Is it any wonder the trial court concluded this clain was 
essentially a draw. 
A. Response to Evidentiary Basis. 
Initially, Aspen points out in this argument that prior to the court's hearing on the 
issue of attorney's fees, it submitted its affidavit of fees incurred in this matter and 
therein apportioned said fees to the three lien cases. Aspen also claims that most of it's 
fees related to the Thaynes Canyon property. 
Aspen further explains that a lien claimant generally must prove that he enhanced 
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the value the property and that because Aspen proved deficiencies in the HVAC system 
and obtained reductions and offsets of other claims (none of which related to deficient 
work but rather, were due to unfinished work or work that had been done which the court 
determined had not been contracted for between the parties), that it establishes Whipple 
did not enhance the value of the property and therefore it is the successful party. 
In response Whipple contends that it also submitted a breakdown of it's attorney 
fees related to the various properties and likewise the greatest amount was apportioned to 
the Thaynes Canyon property. 
Whipple challenges Aspen's claim that a mechanic's lien claimant must prove that 
he enhanced the value of the property to prevail and points to Aspen's failure to cite any 
authority in support of this claim. Nevertheless, Whipple contends that where Aspen 
received the benefit of the installation of the french drains in the amount of $3,162.50, 
the use of the backhoe at a cost to Whipple of $680.00 at least $5,265.00 of value for the 
HVAC system which Aspen was not required to pay for (HVAC contract price of 
$12,265.00 - deficiencies of $7,000.00 = $5,265.00) and since the home was sold with 
the furnaces and duct work as originally installed by Whipple it can be argued that the 
true value conferred on the property was really the entire contract price of $12,265.00 it 
is clear the value of the property was enhanced. So notwithstanding Aspen's argument to 
the contrary Whipple did confer a significant benefit on the Thaynes Canyon property for 
which Whipple was never compensated. 
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Moreover, while Whipple was unable to foreclose its lien Aspen did not prevail to 
such an extent that it should be considered the successful party. While Aspen is quick to 
point to the fact that it prevailed on a few of Whipple's claims, it fails to point out that of 
its alleged six successful claims, two of these, the french drain and backhoe, were 
successful only because there were no contacts for this work not because the work was 
not performed or the work or was deficient (keeping in mind that but for this minor 
technicality either one of these claims being transferred to Whipple's column would have 
changed the net outcome); the relocation of the Park City Water line did not relate 1o the 
Thaynes Canyon property and the $2,000.00 offset of the plumbing contract related only 
to unfinished work since Whipple was discharged from the job site without the 
opportunity to complete the job. 
The point being, is that when all of the evidence is presented it is obvious that the 
trial court did not lose sight of anything. To the contrary, when the trial court's ruling is 
viewed in the context of all the facts the trial court's conclusion that the outcome was 
essentially a draw was a generous concession to Aspen. 
B. Response to Trial Court's Analysis. 
In subparagraph B of Section IV of its Argument, Aspen attempts to make three 
arguments. The first argument is found in the second paragraph where it again argues 
that because the Court awarded Whipple it's fees for prevailing on the Diane Quinn 
property lien and the Thomas Guy Poolhouse property lien, it was error for the Court not 
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to award Aspen its fees for preventing Whipple from foreclosing its lien on the Thayne's 
Canyon property concluding that this fact alone entitled Aspen to successful party status. 
Again, Aspen ignores the holdings in Mountain States and Occidental where the 
court rejected a "net judgment" rule and acknowledged the necessity of a reasoned and 
flexible approach in determining successful party status. The Court of Appeals in 
Whipple //referred to these two opinions in pertinent part as follows: 
TJ16 The plaintiffs in Occidental claimed a balance due 
of over $600,000.00 resulting from a trustee sale. See 
id. The defendants asserted that the sale was valid but 
stipulated to a $7,300.00 deficiency notwithstanding 
the sale. See id. As a result, plaintiffs obtained a 
judgment of approximately $7,300.00 and argued that 
they should therefore be deemed the prevailing party 
and thus be entitled to attorney fees. Defendants 
argued that they should be the prevailing party because 
they had successfully defended against plaintiffs claim 
for $600,000.00, and the court agreed. See id. at 222. 
Using a "flexible and reasoned approach" the court 
determined that, regardless of having prevailed on this 
issue, obtaining a judgment for a small fraction of the 
amount sought was not enough to warrant a recovery 
of attorney fees. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, the trial court or the Court of Appeals did not commit error by refusing to 
declare Aspen as the successful party merely because it obtained a net judgment of 
$527.00 from combined disputed claims of $65,780.55 relative to the Thaynes Canyon 
property. To adopt Aspen's recommended approach is to adopt a "net judgment" rule 
which this court has rejected on more than one occasion. 
The second argument concerns Aspen's attempt to convince this court that it 
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prevailed to a greater extent than acknowledged by both the trial court and the Couit of 
Appeals therefore rendering it the successful party. In support of its position, Aspen 
assails the two court's computations and claims a great injustice has resulted, however, 
Aspen's computation is in error which error was previously pointed out in Whipple's 
Response to Petition for Rehearing filed in the Court of Appeals in A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Const, 2002 Ut. App. 73 (Whipple II). Again, the 
analysis of the various claims is set forth hereafter: 
Initially, it needs to be pointed out that Aspen erroneously 
claims that Whipple's claims on the Thaynes Canyon property were 
originally $47,441.35. In fact, Whipple's claims on the Thaynes 
Canyon property were $40,780.55. The explanation of the 
discrepancy is illustrated as follows: 
Whipple's lien as claimed Whipple's lien as claimed 
by Aspen by Whipple 
Laterals (sewer) $10,200.00 Laterals $10,200.00 
Municipal Water French Drains $3,162.05 
Re-location $ 6,660.806 Backhoe $ 780.00 
French Drains $ 3,162.05 Plumbing $13,358.00 
Backhoe $ 780.00 Heating $12,265.50 
Plumbing $13,358.00 Gas Piping $ 1.015,00 
Heating $12,265.50 Subtotal $40,780.55 
Gas Piping $ 1.015.00 Less Payments <$17.000.00> 
Subtotal $47,441.35 Total Claim $23.780.55 
Less Payments <$17.000.00> 
Total Claim $30.441.35 
Aspen's argument is flawed in four respects. First, it has included a claim in the 
Thaynes Canyon property in the amount of $6,660.80 for the relocation of a municipal 
6This claim did not relate to the Thaynes Canyon property. 
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water line which was never part of the Thaynes Canyon property lien. Second, while the 
court may have erred in calculating the total claim of the Thaynes Canyon property, it did 
not affect the net recovery of Aspen. Third, the difference between the amount 
acknowledged as the total claim of Whipple by the Court of Appeals, to-wit: 
approximately $30,000.00 and the amount Whipple sought at trial, to-wit: approximately 
$40,000.00, relates to assigning value for successfully defended claims. And if it is 
Aspen's contention that value for successfully defended claims be factored in to 
determine successful party status, an approach Whipple readily welcomes, then Whipple 
would attain a net advantage of $17,473.00. This is illustrated by the following analysis: 
TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS OF DAMAGES INCLUDING 
VALUE FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF CLAIMS 
1. Water and sewer laterals from curb to house $ 3,200.00 
2. Plumbing ($14,158.00 less $2,000.00 for offsets) $12,158.00 
3. Gas line $ 1,015.00 
4. Backhoe $ 100.00 
5. Water and sewer laterals from the street to the curb $ 7,000.00 
6. HVAC ($12,265.00 contract price less $3,092.00 to 
finish) $ 9.173.00 
TOTAL DUE WHIPPLE $32,646.00 
AMOUNT PAID BY DEFENDANTS: - $17,000.00 
Offset for damages based on deficient work - $ 7,000.00 
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Less contact price per Court of Appeals - $ 9,173.00 
GRAND TOTAL (due Aspen) ($ 527.00) 
Whipple's successful defense of Defendants' 
Counterclaim in the amount of $25,000.00 
($25,000.00 minus $7,000.00 offset for deficient 
work = $18,000.00) $18,000.00 
NET ADVANTAGE FOR WHIPPLE $ 17,473.00 
Aspen's third argument is to challenge one of the reasons the trial court gave for 
concluding that Aspen was not the successful party. The court stated: 
"Moreover, the court thinks there is an additional 
reason to award no fees. The only reason that the 
defendant received a net recovery, is because it 
prevailed on an essentially legal issue, that is that the 
plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors license 
prevented him from collecting on an equitable basis 
for the installation of the HVAC. 
In order to address this argument, it is helpful, if not absolutely necessary, to 
understand the context of the court's statement. 
First, it was Aspen's contention from the outset that the three furnaces installed 
needed to be replaced (T. p. 108 Tfl9-21). After the trial, the court found the only 
problem with the heating system was leakage and poor air flow to one room as well as no 
ducts to the wet bar area. (Whipple's Addendum 1). Whipple testified that these items 
could be corrected for a few hundred dollars. It is also worth noting that Whipple was 
discharged from the job before the heating job was complete, explaining why some 
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problems remained. 
The court gave Aspen $7,000.00 to correct the minor deficiencies although the 
record is devoid of any evidence as to what the cost to repair said deficiencies would be. 
Furthermore, the home was listed and sold by Aspen without replacing the furnaces or 
ducts as Aspen claimed needed to be done. 
It was clear to the court that based on the dismissal of Whipple's HVAC claim, 
Aspen was receiving three furnaces at no cost and that they had not prevailed to any 
significant extent on the merits of it's counterclaim. Clearly, the court in it's discretion 
concluded that prevailing under these circumstances was certainly less compelling than 
prevailing on the merits of their claim. Nevertheless, omitting this as a justification for 
the court's refusal to award Aspen it's fees does not change the outcome or render the 
trial court's refusal to award Aspen it's attorney fees any less efficacious. 
Additionally, Aspen seems to believe that it's claim to successful party status and 
attorney fees is enhanced because Whipple pursued its HVAC claim despite the court's 
determination that it lacked the proper license. Whipple did nothing more than what the 
court permitted and that was to seek recovery under a quantum merit theory as allowed 
by the court's ruling on May 8, 1995 (Whipple's Addendum 2) which certainly was not 
without precedent. (See Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah. 
App. 1990)) 
Finally, Aspen challenges the trial court's determination that the licensure issue 
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and its negligence claim were not "inextricably tied together" and contends that if this 
court finds that the two claims were "inextricably tied together" that it is automatically 
elevated to successful party status. In support of its claim, it cites the holding in First 
General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996). 
Aspen's logic is wrong and the First General case is distinguishable. Assuming 
arguendo that the licensing issue and the negligence claims are "inextricably tied 
together." Does that change the net outcome of the case? No. Aspen's recovery is not 
increased nor is the outcome of its counterclaim changed favorably. Whether the claims 
are inextricably tied together or not does not affect the net outcome of this case one whit. 
Aspen cites the holding in First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah 
App. 1996), for the proposition that because the Court of Appeals awarded the contractor 
fees for both it's lien foreclosure and defense of counterclaim that it should be awarded 
it's fees because it prevailed on the licensure issue and received a net judgment of 
$527.00. 
First General involved a situation where the claimant would have prevailed under 
any analysis since it's claim was uncompromised, whereas Aspen, while prevailing on 
the licensure issue, prevailed by less than one percent (1%) of total claims related to the 
Thaynes Canyon property and lost as to $18,000.00 of its counterclaim. First General is 
clearly distinguishable for the following reasons: 
Aspen: 
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1) Aspen did not prevail on its counterclaim. 
2) Aspen received judgment in an amount equal to less than one percent (1%) of 
the total claims. 
3) Aspen's only unmitigated success was prevailing on the licensing issue. 
First General: 
1) Claimant prevails completely on its lien. 
2) Claimant totally defeats counterclaim. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the authority of this jurisdiction has 
heretofore taken into consideration more than the net judgment to determine successful 
party status (see Occidental v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990), and more may be 
required to establish successful party status than to demonstrate success on these two 
claims regardless of the kind of claims that are involved. 
Whether the licensure issue and negligence claim are inextricably tied together or 
not seems irrelevant in this case because it does not change the ultimate outcome of the 
parties and, in fact, it can be argued that tying the negligence claim and licensure issue 
together does not enhance Aspen's claim for successful party status rather it detracts 
from it since while Aspen prevailed on the licensure issue it lost on its negligence claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals has, by its holding in Whipple II, done nothing to vitiate 
prior case law or alter the definition or effect of Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18. To the 
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contrary, the court's clarification, or if you will, judicial confirmation of a previously 
acknowledged principle has eliminated the confusion associated with the court's 
interchangeable use of the terms successful party and prevailing party as it applies to 
claims brought under Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18. 
Aspen's attempt to convince this court to now create two judicial constructions so 
a "net judgment" rule becomes the law relative to mechanics lien claims would overturn 
prior judicial interpretation and in the final analysis would be, by far and away, the most 
inequitable approach. To take away the trial court's discretion to consider the totality of 
facts in a particular case and hamstring a judge so he or she is compelled to award 
disproportionate fees relative to the amount of a particular judgment is simply bad law. 
Aspen's attempt to convince this court to award it significant attorney fees on a 
recovery of less than one percent (1%) of total claims has no legal precedent in this 
jurisdiction and for obvious reasons, the court should deny it's request. 
Whipple respectfully requests that this court deny Aspen's appeal and confirm the 
Court of Appeals ruling in Whipple IL Finally, Whipple requests that it be awarded its 
attorney fees and costs related to all appeals which Whipple has prevailed on. This 
request has been made in previous appeals, however the Court of Appeals has, for some 
unknown reason, ignored this request. 
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DATED this (£,5 day of March, 2003. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Whipple v. Aspen Construction 
As a preliminary matter the court has reviewed Judge Brian's order carefully and is of 
the opinion that he intended that Whipple be compensated, on an equitable basis, for the work 
done and benefit conferred on the premises, with adjustments for Aspen's costs to finish the 
work and to correct any work that needed correcting. The matter has been prepared for trial 
and tried to the court with that understanding. 
At closing argument counsel for Aspen argued that Whipple had not met the threshold 
requirement of establishing mechanics liens. However it is the courts recollection that there 
was oral evidence that liens had been filed, to which there was no objection, and in addition 
the case was tried over a four and one-half day period without any objections to any of the 
evidence of Whipple's claimed damages on the basis of no mechanic's liens. The court is 
going to allow the claims of Whipple to stand. 
Turning to the merits of the claims of the parties, the court finds and rules as follows: 
• That the work performed by Whipple installing laterals from the curb to the house 
was not included m the written contracts between the parties for the plumbing work and 
awards Whipple $3,200 for that work. 
• That Whipple is owed $1,666 for work performed on the Tom Guy pool house. 
• That on the issue of the relocation of the Park City irrigation line the testimony of 
Kevin Monson is the more credible and accordingly awards Whipple nothing for that work. 
• That Aspen's testimony as to the french drain the more credible and awards Whipple 
nothing for that claim. 
• The court awards Whipple $100 for use of the backhoe. 
• The court awards Whipple $631 for the Quinn gas line. 
• That Whipple is entitled to $13,000 on its plumbing contract plus $1,158 for extras. 
• That Aspen is entitled to a $2000 offset on the plumbing contract for costs to finish. 
• That Whipple, in equity is entitled to $9,173 on its heating contract with Aspen. 
($12,265 less $3,092 for Aspen's costs to finish.) 
• The court is of the opinion that Aspen has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that there are deficiencies in the heating system. (Leakage and poor air flow to one 
room as well as no ducts to a portion of the basement in the area of the wet bar.) Aspen has 
failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence, however, that it will be necessary to 
completely remove the existing system and install a new system. Aspen has also failed to 
show that the 3 furnaces currently installed are inadequate or that the ducting into and out of 
said furnaces is improperly sized. Mr. Neely's testimony on this issue was vague at best. 
The ducting at the furnaces meets Uniform Mechanical Code requirements. It has not been 
shown to the satisfaction of the court that any specifications or recommendations of the 
manufacturer have not been met. The evidence of a higher industry standard was vague and 
not convincing to the court. 
The court is further of the opinion that many of the problems may be addressed with 
further adjustments and fine tuning of the system such as complete installation of thermostats 
as designed by Whipple, connecting and operating of zone dampers etc. However, some work 
will need to be done to correct the deficiencies mentioned by the court and for that the court 
awards Aspen $7,000. 
• That Whipple is entitled to $1,015 for gas line installation. 
• That Whipple has already been paid $17,000. 
The court, therefore calculates the amount due and owing Whipple to be $3,943. 
The court us of the opinion that neither party has clearly prevailed and therefore will 
award no attorney's fees. 
Counsel for Aspen is to prepare more detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
a judgement consistent with this ruling and submit them in the proper manner for the court's 
signature. 
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has been tested and it has been carefully inspected and is found to 
be operational in all respects in conformity with the contract 
I specifications and customary standards of industry including all 
express and implied warranties and representations and the home 
otherwise restored to its present finished condition then the 
Plaintiff will be permitted to recover from the Defendant the 
I difference on what has been spent and what it cost. In this 
respect the Defendant is not out of any money that was not 
I contracted for up front but will have received the benefit of his 
bargain. Because the benefit will have been thus conferred 
compensation will then be due to the Plaintiff. The court feels 
that this is only fair and so finds an^rder^ 
Bfecause-the correetive-work will-entail worte-eneompassing at 
lea&tr-^:wo~nornnorenn^tds^ , 
I paJjafcingi, as well as the underlying HVAC^gork) the inspections-and 
work-must^be-eompletea^y-and^ of independent 
} licensed—general contractor with ^ adequate quali^ fd:catioTrTs^ whc) is 
absolutely unacquainted with either side directly or otherwise, and 
the corrective work, whatever it may be, J,s to be performed within 
a reasonable period of time. The court would think that that 
should be accomplished by July 15, 1995. 
This ruling is without prejudice as to the remaining issues 
' and is intended to resolve the Motion to Dismiss with respect to 
j the HVAC work only. The system and work must meet code and it must 
I pass the various independent inspections specified above. 
j DATED this day of June, 1995. 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
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contractor that the statute in question is mandatory in its 
application and that in the totality the Plaintiff's failure to 
comply with the statute is sufficient grounds for the Motion to 
Dismiss to be granted as a matter of law with the following 
provisions: 
The court still believes that there is a requirement to apply 
principles of equity, whenever fairness and justice mandates. The 
court will permit the Plaintiff to have independent licensed 
contractors to examine the Plaintiff's work as will be necessary to 
correct the problems. The court will permit the Defendant to 
undertake the same inspections. The licensed contractors who 
undertake to examine the Plaintiff's work are to be totally 
independent of the Plaintiff and the Defendant. They are not to be 
friends# work associates, acquaintances or in any other way be 
suspect of any bias or prejudice in or on behalf of the Plaintiff 
or the Defendant. 
If the work performed by the Plaintiff needs correcting and 
the estimates obtained by both the Plaintiff and Defendant are 
comparable, the court will permit the Plaintiff to engage the 
services of the necessary licensed contractors to correct the work J 
to the satisfaction of a licensed—mechanical—engineer who is 
familiar^ --with the customary standards—of—the—HVAG-industry wTEh 
jregards-to adequacy of furnaces7—air- flow, and—its—distribution 
overall rif>.5vign and layout and any othei^standardg--^u^t^ma^y-^Q^thpJ 
HVAC-industry. Once the heating system has been connected and it 
In accordance with the recent decision in American Rural Cellular. Inc., v. Systems 
Communication Corp.. P.2d , 258 Utah Adv. Rep. 1317 (1995) the Defendant's status 
is only one factor (see discussion page 17). 
Joseph M. Chambers 0612 
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Attorney for Defendants 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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This matter came before the court on May 8, 1995, for oral 
argument with regards to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss inl 
I 
relationship to the Plaintiff's failure to be properly licensed inj 
accordance with Section 58-55-604 Utah Code Annotated. j 
i 
The court having considered the parties1 legal memorandums and 
the submissions made during oral arguments, the court finds and 
I 
rules as follows on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss: ! 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED & DECREED: ! 
1. The statute Section 58-55-604 U.C.A. is controlling in 
i 
this case. A threshold requirement for the Plaintiff to recover is' 
the compliance with the foregoing statute regarding licensing. The 
court finds that notwithstanding that the Defendant is a general 
During oral arguments the Defendant's counsel made it clear that the foregoing motion was 
made only with regards to the HVAC work and not the plumbing work except to the limited extent that 
there may be an offset as to the plumbing work. 
